Radboud University Nijmegen

Faculty Member, Faculty of Philosophy

Full professor philosophy of mind

Faculty of philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

About

My current research interests can be sub-divided into three strands: 1. Social cognition and theories of mind, 2. The causal efficacy of conscious intentions and decisions, and 3. The nature and function of consciousness.

Social cognition and theories of mind
Within the debate on social cognition the term ‘theory of mind’ is used to refer to our ability to understand and predict the behaviour of others. In psychology and cognitive neuroscience the term is often used in a noncommittal way. But within philosophy (and at times also in psychology and neuroscience) it is used more specifically to denote our ability to understand others as being motivated by beliefs and desires, usually understood as non-perceivable, ‘hidden’ states. When understood in this more specific sense I tend to side with the small minority of philosophers who think we should not conceive of social interaction as being mediated mainly by theory of mind. That is, I largely agree with those who argue that understanding others is not a matter of making (implicit) assumptions about a mental realm hidden ‘behind’ overt behaviour (i.e. those who reject both standard theories in this debate, the theory-theory and the simulation theory). We usually see emotions and intentions directly in facial expressions, gestures and bodily postures and it is misleading to reconstruct such social perception in terms of implicit belief/desire attribution. This option, however, leaves a number of crucial questions unanswered.
First of all, we should be clear about the social cognitive mechanisms that are operative when we ‘see’ emotions and intentions in the behaviour of others. This used to be a focal point of my research, in particular since I am not entirely in agreement with the main proposals on this topic (more specifically, I tend to think that some forms of simulationism are not far removed from the idea of social perception). Lately, however, my attention has shifted to what I think are more important questions: If social interaction is not primarily mediated by theory of mind, then where does the widely shared intuition come from that in understanding others, we implicitly attribute beliefs and desires? Is this simply a massive error, or is there a better explanation? Also: what are we to think of the occasions in which we do explicitly attribute beliefs and desires to others? The answers to these questions that I propose are connected. First, I argue that belief and desire attribution is not ubiquitous in social interaction, but rather a way of understanding, modeling or reconstructing our ubiquitous, non-mentalizing grasp of other people. Second, I argue that once we have mastered this reconstructing ability, which we use to explain our own assessment of social situations to others, we can use belief and desire attribution in situations where our non-mentalizing grasp of others fails.

The causal efficacy of conscious intentions and decisions
An increasing set of neuroscientific and psychological experiments appear to show that conscious intentions and decisions are not as causally efficacious in producing our actions as common sense would have it. Though this conclusion is sometimes contested by philosophers, I generally accept it. I am interested in two sets of questions that follow from this acceptance: 1. Does the fact that my conscious states do not directly cause my actions leave room for the idea that my actions are nevertheless in an important sense mine? In other words, can the acting self be a largely unconscious self? If so, how should we conceive of such a self? 2. What is the relation between conscious decisions and the acting self? Is there a less direct way in which conscious decisions do contribute to our actions?
With respect to the first set of questions, I defend the idea of an unconscious self. Various philosophical theories about the nature of the self, such as narrative theories of selfhood, appear not to require or presuppose the identification of a self with conscious intentions and decisions. Without this presupposition, the recent finds on the causal inefficacy of consciousness are significantly less alarming than many would think. With respect to the second set of questions, I accept and defend the commonsensical idea that conscious episodes—decision making, deliberation, etc.—are crucial to the formation of a self. If such episodes are entirely inefficacious, causally speaking, with respect to the production of actions, that would endanger the idea that we can act authentically, i.e. that my actions are in an important sense mine. I argue that such conscious episodes are not the direct, triggering causes of action. Rather they are the structuring causes for many of our actions. That is, they prime us to be responsive to specific affordances in our environment. Thus, even though our actions are direct, unconscious responses to certain affordances (that is, these affordances trigger our actions), conscious decisions do play a causal role in bringing about our actions.

The nature and function of consciousness
Neurophenomenologists claim that subjective consciousness is a real referent of our introspective utterances. Dennett’s heterophenomenological approach, by contrast, treats consciousness as a fictional referent. As many philosophers have noted, both approaches can deal equally well with the scientific data on consciousness and its neural correlates. The opposition between the two approaches is a purely philosophical one. I try to show how a middle position in between neurophenomenology and heterophenomenology is possible and why it is the most plausible option available. For this middle position I combine Wittgenstein’s views on introspective utterances as expressions with Julian Jaynes’ views on the nature of consciousness. Because Jaynes held absurd views about the origin of consciousness, his highly original and insightful views on the nature of consciousness have been largely ignored. The combined view, (too) briefly put, holds that introspective utterances are expressions by means of metaphors (in which conscious thought is the analogue of physical action in a metaphorical inner space). It is incorrect to say that introspective utterances thus understood have a fictional referent only. But neither is it correct to say that they describe a subjective reality.
This alternative view on the nature of consciousness changes our views on its function. I argue that introspective utterances are neither descriptions of an inner realm, nor useful fictions; they are interpretive utterances in terms of which we attempt to make sense of ourselves.

The connection between the three topics and future research
The general question that lurks in the background in each of these strands of my research is how an embodied, embedded, enactive account of human cognition can accommodate higher forms of cognition. I am attracted to an embodied, enactive conception of cognition. But such accounts usually focus primarily on low level forms of cognition such as e.g. coping with one’s physical environment or reading basic emotions and intentions in the gestures and facial expressions of others. The general question I am interested in is how an embodied, enactive view of cognition can make room for an of understanding or ourselves in terms of beliefs, desires, complex thoughts, emotions, values, intentions, plans, etc. My hunch is that this question can best be answered by noting that, in Charles Taylor’s phrase, we are self-interpreting animals: accounts of our own inner episodes, as well as ascriptions of beliefs, desires, etc. to others are, I believe, best viewed as linguistically and culturally mediated interpretations of ourselves and each other. On this account we are not committed to what Dennett would call an ‘industrial strength realism’ about higher-level mental states which would be hard to fit into a general embodied, enactive conception of cognition.
This view is behind my positions on the three topics described above. Thus, at least in this indirect respect, these positions are connected. I have recently begun to explore more direct connections. In particular I think there are two overlaps worth investigating: 1. There is an apparent similarity between the notion of models that I use to characterize our primary use of belief-desire ascription and the notion of metaphors that I use in my account of consciousness that I would like to explore in future research. 2. I would like to investigate psychological evidence about priming through linguistic formulation. This may well connect my view on consciousness with my views on the indirect efficacy of conscious decisions in terms of self-priming.

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